---

 [FrontPage HTML Markup Component][FrontPage HTML Markup Component][FrontPage HTML Markup Component]CROATIAN WORLD CONGRESS

HRVATSKI SVJETSKI KONGRES

NOTICE OF THE EXISTENCE OF INFORMATION CONCERNING SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIBUNAL COMMITTED BY UNITED STATES OFFICIALS

REQUEST THAT THE PROSECUTOR INVESTIGATE NAMED INDIVIDUALS FOR VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND PREPARE INDICTMENTS AGAINST THEM PURSUANT TO ARTICLES 18.1 AND 18.4 OF THE TRIBUNAL STATUTE. 

 

Madam Carla Del Ponte

Prosecutor

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

Churchillplein 1, 2501 EW,

The Hague,

Netherlands

 

Dear Prosecutor Del Ponte:

 

On behalf of the Croatian World Congress, a non-governmental organization that is a member of the United Nations with advisory status, you are hereby notified pursuant to Article 18(1) of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia of the existence of information concerning serious violations of international humanitarian law (hereinafter “IHL”), namely that officials of the United States of America, including but not limited to William Jefferson Clinton, Anthony Lake, Samuel Berger, Richard Holbrooke,  Peter Galbraith and/or George J. Tenet (hereinafter collectively referred to as “U.S. officials”), aided and abetted Croatian General Ante Gotovina, who was indicted by your office on 8 June 2001.

In your indictment against General Ante Gotovina, you allege that General Gotovina is responsible for crimes committed during and after Operation Storm, a Croatian military operation against the so-called “Republika Srpska Krajina.”  The indictment alleges that the operation was a preplanned ethnic cleansing campaign that resulted in the deportation of over 150,000 Croatian Serbs in August 1995, as well as the murder of over 150 Croatian Serbs. The indictment charges that:

Between 17 July 1995 and 15 November 1995, Ante GOTOVINA, acting individually and/or in concert with others, including President Franjo Tudjman, planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of the crimes charged below in the course of, and after, the "Oluja" offensive. Ante GOTOVINA is individually responsible for the crimes alleged against him in this indictment pursuant to the provisions of Article 7(1) of the Statute of the Tribunal. Individual criminal responsibility includes planning, instigating, ordering, committing or otherwise aiding and abetting in the planning, preparation or execution of any crimes referred to in Articles 2 to 5 of the Statute.

 

It is thus the contention of your office that as early as 17 July 1995 (over two weeks prior to Operation Storm), General Gotovina had “acted in concert with others” and had “planned, instigated, ordered committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning preparation or execution of the crimes charged below in the course of, and after, the “Oluja” offensive.

            At the outset, the Croatian World Congress (“CWC”) wishes to express its deep dismay at your indictment of General Gotovina.  The CWC firmly believes that General Gotovina is innocent of the charges you have leveled against him and that Operation Storm was carried out professionally and in full accordance and respect for international humanitarian law.  Nevertheless, your office persists with its prosecution of General Gotovina, which as a matter of law suggests that you believe you have evidence that General Gotovina is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. 

            If this is in fact the case, then the CWC believes that justice demands that you prosecute all potential perpetrators, and all nations must be treated evenhandedly.  The ICTY has come under consistent criticism that it applies one set of standards for the countries and citizens in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, while it applies a different set of standards for the countries of Western Europe and North America.  For this reason, we bring this Notice pursuant to Article 18(1) of the Tribunal’s Statute in order to allow your office to demonstrate that it applies justice evenhandedly.

THE UNITED STATES PARTICIPATED IN OPERATION STORM     

Much evidence has been made public that demonstrates that United States officials aided and abetted Operation Storm.  These public facts include:

1.                  The "Green Light": It is public knowledge that US officials in fact gave the green light to the Croatians to start Operation Storm.  The United States of course denies this, but information has seeped into the public domain. 

 

A.  The Observer, 30 July 1995:  On July 30, 1995 [six days before Operation Storm began], the British newspaper The Observer quoted unnamed Western diplomatic sources as saying that US officials had given the Croats a green light.  The Observer quotes the diplomat as follows: ". . .Diplomatic sources in the area, who declined to be identified, said the Croat offensive followed the discreet encouragement of the United States. 'Croatia has been given the thumbs up by America,' said a Western source. 'They basically said: "We understand you've got to do it. Just do it fast and don't misbehave"...

 

B. Testimony of the head of Croatian military counterintelligence:  In August 2001, the Croatian Army's head of counterintelligence at the time of Operation Storm announced in the Croatian paper "Narodni List" as follows: "Former chief of Croatian Army's counterintelligence Markica Rebic stated today that Pentagon and the CIA were completely supervising operation ‘Oluja’ (Storm) of Croatia Army in 1995. Rebic also claims that he had gotten a message from American military attache that the USA did not have anything against Oluja, if Croatia performed it quickly and cleanly."  As you can see, the Observer story from 1995 and Rebic's interview six years later portray a very similar "green light" message from the United States.

C.  Testimony of Croatian President Stipe Mesic:  Current Croatian President Stipe Mesic also claims that the United States gave the green light for Operation Storm.  Mesic gave an interview in the German weekly magazine Der Spiegel on 7 August 1995.  In the interview, Mr. Mesic states as follows:

 

“I am certain that President Tudjman would never have undertaken this Operation [Storm] had he not received the green light from the United States and Germany.  . .  . I believe that President Clinton thinks that Congress will override his veto [of Congressional legislation authorizing the unilateral lifting of the United Nations arms embargo against Bosnia-Herzegovina] and that his policy with respect to Bosnia would be viewed as a complete failure.  On the other hand, if Croatia were to conquer Knin, then it would be possible to defend Bihac as well, and then end the siege of Sarajevo, which would finally force the Serbs to the negotiating table.”

 

2.                  Knowledge of Events During Operation Storm:  US officials’ involvement in Operation Storm extended much further than simply giving the Green Light, however.  According to the 27 August 2001 issue of Newsweek magazine, the Central Intelligence Agency stationed a base inside a Croatian Army base near Zadar, Croatia.  This CIA base was used to launch unmanned intelligence aircraft known as GNAT 750s, which allowed  the CIA to monitor the entire operation.  These video images were transmitted back to the Pentagon, thus allowing individuals in Washington to monitor the entire Operation Storm.  Moreover, according to Newsweek, the CIA shared these videos with General Gotovina in an effort to assist in the success of Operation Storm, and in fact did assist Gotovina in smashing a Serb counteroffensive.  US officials thus had knowledge of events in the so-called Krajina and were assisting the Croatian Army in its offensive.  Moreover, US officials were aiding and abetting General Gotovina in carrying out Operation Storm.

3.                  Violations of the United Nations Arms Embargo:  The United Nations Security Council, pursuant to Resolutions 713 and 727, imposed a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to the countries of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  US officials nevertheless engaged in a covert military operation designed to arm not only the Croatian Army (HV), but also the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina (ABiH) in clear violation of Security Council Resolutions 713 and 727.  

                        Former U.S. Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith admitted in an interview in the Croatian daily “Vecernji List” on 21 July 2001 that the provision of intelligence information to the Croatian Army would amount to a “serious breach of the UN arms embargo.”  It was subsequently learned in Newsweek that the United States did in fact provide such intelligence information to General Gotovina and the HV.

                        In 1996, an inquiry by the United States Congress as well as the Los Angeles Times revealed that United States officials, and particularly Amb. Galbraith, President Clinton, and Lake, approved of a plan that allowed Croatia and Bosnia to import weapons from Iran.  See US Had Options to Let Bosnia Get Arms, Avoid Iran, Los Angeles Times, 14 July 1996; Closer US Role Seen on Bosnia-Iran Arms Pipeline, Los Angeles Times, 23 December 1996.  US officials played a pivotal role in arming the HV in advance of Operation Storm, all in knowing violation of a UN arms embargo.

4.                  Air Support for Operation Storm: In addition to providing intelligence support, US officials also provided air support to the Croatian offensive.  On the first day of Operation Storm, two U.S. planes attacked Krajina Serb positions.  The press agency Deutsche Presse-Agentur reported as follows:

 

NATO spokesman Jim Mitchell in Aviano, Italy, said the two U.S. navy pilots, flying EA-6B Prowlers, fired at a Krajina Serb missile site in self-defence as they were flying over the embattled area at the request of U.N. military commanders. EA-6B Prowlers are electronic warfare aircraft used to protect strike aircraft and ships by jamming enemy radar, electronic data links and communications.

 

The missile site that the United States destroyed was near Udbina airport, which allowed the Croats to destroy the airport and prevent the Krajina Serbs from using airpower against the Croatian offensive.  It is important to note that the US was using EA-6B Prowlers which, as the above quote states, are "electronic warfare aircraft".  It is possible that the US was jamming Krajina Serb communications on the ground and thus assisting the Croats. 

 

5.                  The Croats were Aour junkyard dogs@: US Ambassador Richard Holbrooke's memoirs on this period, entitled To End A War, are full of admissions of the United States' command role in Operation Storm. 

Holbrooke recalls on page 73 a dinner he and US Ambassador Robert Frasure were having with Franjo Tudjman on 17 August 1995 (thirteen days after Operation Storm began).  Holbrooke recounts that Ambassador Frasure passed him a note during this dinner which stated as follows:

"Dick: We hired these guys to be our junkyard dogs because we were desperate.  We need to try to control them.  But this is no time to get squeamish about things.  This is the first time the Serb wave has been reversed.  That is essential for us to get stability, so we can get out."

 

[Emphasis added].  Holbrooke's book thus offers concrete admissions that the United States hired the Croats to be our junkyard dogs.  The passage even reflects that the US needed to control them. 

6.                  Holbrooke's Control Over Croatian Military Operations: Holbrooke's book makes clear that the United States in general, and Holbrooke in particular, were in control of Croatian forces and were using the Croatian Army as their own ground troops in an effort to achieve preconditions necessary for the Dayton Peace Agreement.  At page 160, Holbrooke admits to telling Tudjman which towns to take:

"I told Tudjman the offensive had great value to the negotiations.  It would be much easier to retain at the table what had been won on the battlefield than to get the Serbs to give up territory they had controlled for several years.  I urged Tudjman to take Sanski Most, Prijedor, and Bosanski Novi all important towns that had become worldwide symbols of ethnic cleansing. . . .Banja Luka, I said, was a different matter."

 

Later, Holbrooke writes at page 166 that he told Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak:

 

"Nothing we said today should be construed to mean that we want you to stop the rest of the offensive, other than Banja Luka.  Speed is important.  We can't say so publicly, but please take Sanski Most, Prijedor and Bosanski Novi.  And do it quickly, before the Serbs regroup!"

 

It is plain from Holbrooke's own words that he was giving orders both to Tudjman and to Susak in the military arena.  At the very least, Holbrooke was providing a level of encouragement for Croatian military operations that rises to the level of aiding and abetting under IHL.  Per Holbrooke's instructions, the Croats attacked all three cities, but only succeeded in taking Sanski Most.  The US was intimately involved in Croatian military operations.

7.                  Holbrooke Encouraged The Croats Despite Human Rights Violations: Holbrooke encouraged the Croatian offensives despite knowledge that violations of international humanitarian law were occurring.  Holbrooke himself writes as follows on page 160:

"Even while encouraging the offensive, Galbraith and I expressed great concern over the many refugees already displaced.  We told Tudjman that there was no excuse for the brutal treatment of Serbs that followed most Croatian military successes.  The abuse of Serb civilians, most of whom had lived in the area for generations, was wrong.  Using a provocative phrase normally applied only to the Serbs, I told Tudjman that the current Croatian behavior might be viewed as a milder form of ethnic cleansing."

 

Holbrooke here admits to encouraging HV military operations despite actual knowledge of violations that have occurred in the aftermath of Operation Storm. 

8.                  The Ability to Stop the Operation: It is clear that at all relevant times, the United States had the ability to issue a "Red Light" to the Croats.  In fact, as cited above, Holbrooke did issue a red light to the Croats: the town of Banja Luka.  Holbrooke told the Croats that they needed to take Sanski Most, Prijedor and Bosnaski Novi, but would stop when they reached the outskirts of Banja Luka.  That is exactly what happened.

A book written by Ivo Daalder titled, Getting to Dayton, also demonstrates the ability of the United States at that time to halt the Croats.  Daalder writes in footnote 20 on page 124:

Holbrooke and Galbraith met with Tudjman on September 17 to tell him not to take Banja Luka.  The other members of the team met at the same time with Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak, who proudly displayed maps depicting the Croat gains.  Susak showed the Americans the key mountain near Banja Luka that his forces would take within twenty-four hours, enabling the capture of the major Serb-held city within forty-eight hours.  When informed by the Americans that the United States wanted the offensive halted before it reached the city, Susak was astonished and disappointed, but Banja Luka was not taken.  Interview with an administration official, April 1, 1998.  See also Holbrooke, To End A War, p. 160.

 

It is thus clear that the United States had the ability to stop the offensive whenever it was in the US interest to do so.

Galbraith’s Admissions Regarding Control:  Galbraith shed further light on the degree of control exercised by US officials over Croatian military operations in the summer and fall of 1995.  In an interview with the magazine Dani, 3 August 2001, Galbraith describes the level of control as follows:

It’s still not entirely clear how it came about that the Croat forces halted their advance before Banja Luka. Your testimony could throw additional light on the circumstances under which the operation was called off.

That was one of the absolutely key moments in the war. Even now I can’t tell you whether we did the right thing. Perhaps we did, perhaps we didn’t...

What was your problem?

I’ll tell you what my problem was at the time, and how I look at things today. It was September and Holbrooke had arrived with his team. Ordinarily we two would first have gone directly to Tudjman and talked with him for an hour, an hour and a half, before joining his ministers. We were waiting outside Tudjman’s office, Holbrooke had come in from Belgrade, with instructions from the Secretary of State to tell Tudjman not to take Banja Luka, and he asked me what I thought about it.

Was he in two minds too?

It was my impression that Holbrooke didn’t think he had to obey his instructions, since on previous occasions he hadn’t obeyed them either. And he asked me. People on the inside will tell you that I was a hawk, that I called for military intervention and favoured a military solution. But at that moment I too had certain doubts. My doubts related to two things: one was the refugee population from western Bosnia and the Krajina which was in the area, as well as the local population, since I had already seen the Croats in action. It’s true that the city was in the hands of people whom I consider fascists, but there were normal people there too, women and children, innocent people. I was worried about the potential consequences of the 400,000-strong wave of refugees that would have passed through the Posavina corridor and Brcko, and the humanitarian catastrophe it would have produced. On the other hand, I was afraid we might replace one problem by another. In other words, if Tudjman took Banja Luka would he give it up? I’d often heard him talking about how Banja Luka had traditionally been oriented towards Zagreb, and I know what that meant: when we divide up Bosnia, Banja Luka will be in Croatia. I think Holbrooke was influenced by the fact that Milosevic had told him that in Banja Luka there were Serbs representing an alternative leadership to Pale. We discussed this and both came to the conclusion that we should tell Tudjman to halt. Holbrooke told him that. It was a very hard decision, and if we’d felt only slightly differently it would have been different. Sometimes history is made not by big, carefully pondered strategic decisions, but precisely like this.

How does it strike you from today’s perspective?

The reason for allowing Croatia to take Banja Luka was that it would have meant the total collapse of the Bosnian Serbs and the fascist principles they espoused. It would have been far easier to reconstruct the country in the conditions of a total Serb defeat than it is at present. And we did think about this at the time. But even today I don’t know the right answer. The peace would have been far more stable if the Croatian Army had taken Banja Luka.

In other words, you regret your decision?

Not necessarily. The other side of the coin is the question of how many more people would have died. I don’t know what the price is. I only know these are hard decisions that cannot be avoided. We had the responsibility for taking that decision and I think we took it on the basis of the best possible assessment we could make at the time. During the past six years I’ve thought about it every day.

 

[Emphasis added].  It is clear that the US officials had the ability to give a “red light” in order to stop HV military operations.

9.         Florence Hartmann’s account of US involvement in Storm:  Your press spokeswoman, Florence Hartmann, authored a book in 1999 entitled, Milosevic: La Diagonale du Fou, based on her experiences as a war correspondent for Le Monde.  In the book, Ms. Hartmann writes an entire chapter on the events in so-called “Krajina.”  Ms. Hartmann contends in the book that the United States was the “godfather” of Operation Storm, and actually planned out Operation Storm through a private company of retired US military officers called Military Professional Resources, Inc. (“MPRI”).  Ms. Hartmann contends in the book that the United States deployed MPRI to plan Operation Storm.   Ms. Hartmann goes on to claim that William Jefferson Clinton knew that the Operation had been planned by MPRI.

These are the facts that are in the public domain.  The United States gave a green light to Operation Storm and provided intelligence support, air support, and even anti-communication electronic warfare aircraft.  The United States officials would have had actual knowledge of any abuses that were occurring.  Moreover, the United States officials continued to provide diplomatic, political and intelligence support to the HV even after international officials, including Carl Bildt, had claimed as early as the first day of Operation Storm that violations of IHL were occurring.  Thus, if indeed you believe that Operation Storm was a pre-planned campaign of ethnic cleansing that lasted from 4 August 1995 through 15 November 1995, then the United States officials certainly had actual knowledge of events from the first day of Operation Storm, and nevertheless continued to aid and abet the Operation.  Finally, it is clear that the United States had the ability to stop the Croat offensive whenever it was in the United States= interest to do so.

AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES OFFICIALS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

 

The elements of aiding and abetting liability are well established under international law, and were specifically addressed by the Tribunal in the case of Prosecutor v. Furundzija, “Judgement,” 10 December 1998.  In that judgment, the Trial Chamber found the state of international law with respect to aiding and abetting liability to be as follows:

245. The above analysis leads the Trial Chamber to the conclusion that it is not necessary for the accomplice to share the mens rea of the perpetrator, in the sense of positive intention to commit the crime. Instead, the clear requirement in the vast majority of the cases is for the accomplice to have knowledge that his actions will assist the perpetrator in the commission of the crime. This is particularly apparent from all the cases in which persons were convicted for having driven victims and perpetrators to the site of an execution. In those cases the prosecution did not prove that the driver drove for the purpose of assisting in the killing, that is, with an intention to kill. It was the knowledge of the criminal purpose of the executioners that rendered the driver liable as an aider and abettor. Consequently, if it were not proven that a driver would reasonably have known that the purpose of the trip was an unlawful execution, he would be acquitted.

246. Moreover, it is not necessary that the aider and abettor should know the precise crime that was intended and which in the event was committed. If he is aware that one of a number of crimes will probably be committed, and one of those crimes is in fact committed, he has intended to facilitate the commission of that crime, and is guilty as an aider and abettor.

 

Thus, in order for you to prove a case of aiding and abetting liability against the US officials, it will not be necessary to prove that the US officials shared the same criminal intent as you allege was possessed by General Gotovina or Croatian Armed Forces.  Instead, all that need be shown is that the US officials had knowledge that their actions would assist the HV in the commission of its alleged crimes.

            The US officials clearly would have had knowledge that their actions were assisting the HV, and furthermore would have had knowledge of any criminal activity on the part of the HV.  Indeed, Galbraith in interviews in the Croatian press has acknowledged that “[Defense Minister Susak] informed me of the plans before the Operation began” (Vjesnik, 29 July 2001), and also that the US officials “foresaw that violations of human rights would occur” during Operation Storm (Slododna Dalmacija, 23 August 2001).  Moreover, it is clear from the excerpts of Holbrooke’s book quoted above that US officials continued to encourage HV military operations with full knowledge that violations of IHL had occurred. 

            The facts in the public domain are thus as follows: the United States officials violated the United Nations arms embargo by allowing the HV to obtain weapons from Iran, and violated the arms embargo by providing training and planning through MPRI.  The United States officials set up a CIA post inside of an HV base from which they were not only able to obtain real-time video footage of events transpiring on the ground during Operation Storm (and thus imputing to them knowledge of events on the ground), but also from which they could provide such intelligence data to General Gotovina to assist him in conducting Operation Storm.  If General Gotovina carried out a pre-planned campaign to deport 150,000 to 200,000 Croatian Serb civilians, then the CIA base was not only used to provide knowledge to US officials of such a plan and course of conduct on the part of General Gotovina, but was also used to assist General Gotovina in achieving the goals of his alleged plan.

The public facts further indicate that the United States officials encouraged Operation Storm by providing a “green light” to proceed.  United States officials provided diplomatic and political “cover” to Croatia to allow the Operation to proceed without any significant diplomatic or political consequences to Croatia.  United States officials have acknowledged that the HV were “our junkyard dogs” whom they “hired because they were desperate.”  Holbrooke in his book acknowledges encouraging the HV to continue with its operations despite his actual knowledge that violations of IHL had occurred.

The Croatian World Congress wishes to reemphasize its position that neither General Gotovina nor the US officials should be under indictment by your office.  On the contrary, they should be praised for defeating Milosevic’s forces and establishing the preconditions necessary for the Dayton Peace Accords.  We maintain that, while violations of IHL may have occurred in the aftermath of Operation Storm, they were not part of an overall plan to ethnically cleanse Serbs from Croatia.  Rather, they were individual incidents that were driven by the passions of a few individuals.  Nevertheless, if your office insists on prosecuting General Gotovina, then the interests of justice demand that you apply an evenhanded approach that will investigate all potential suspects equally.

If General Gotovina is guilty, then the US officials are guilty of aiding and abetting him.  To put it simply, the question is, “Would General Gotovina been able to carry out Operation Storm without the assistance of the US officials?”  The answer, of course, is no.  General Gotovina could not have successfully completed Operation Storm without the weapons that were obtained with US approval, or the intelligence data that was provided to him during the course of the Operation.  The HV could not have completed the Operation without a green light from the US and without the diplomatic and political “cover” the US provided. The effective control exercised by the US officials over the HV is demonstrated by the fact that, when the US officials decided that the military operations must be stopped at Banja Luka, the HV stopped at Banja Luka.  In short, the United States played a decisive role in Operation Storm. 

It is now upon you to demonstrate that justice is blind and that your office conducts criminal investigations based on the law and facts, and not based on political considerations.  It is our primary hope that you will recognize the error that occurred in indicting General Gotovina in the first place.  If, however, your office continues to insist on pursuing that indictment, then it is our second hope that you will demonstrate to us and to the entire world that you treat all nations equally.  We are confident that you will agree with our position that no country can be “more equal” than another when it comes to your enforcement of the provisions of the Tribunal’s Statute as mandated by the Security Council.

Madam Prosecutor, please be assured of my highest consideration.

                                                                                                Respectfully submitted,

                                                                                                           

                                                                                                                                                Prof. Dr. Šimun Šito Coric                                                                                                                    President                                                                                                                                              Croatian World Congress

 

Cc: Members of the Security Council:

Ambassador Setphan Tafrov
Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to the United Nations
11 East 84th Street
New York, NY 10028

Ambassador Martin Belinga-Eboutou
Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the United Nations
22 East 73rd Street
New York, NY 11021
 
Ambassador Wang Yingfan
Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations
350 East 35th Street, New York, NY 10016
 
Ambassador Alfonso Valdivieso
Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations
140 East 57th Street, 5th Floor, New York, NY 10022
 

Ambassador Jean-David Levitte
Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations
One Dag Hammarskjold Plaza, 245 East 47th Street, 44th Floor New York, NY 10017

Ambassador Francois Lonseny Fall
Permanent Representative of Guinea to the United Nations
140 East 39th Street
New York NY 10016
 
Ambassador Richard Ryan
Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations
One Dag Hammarskjold Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 19th Floor, New York, NY 10017
 

Ambassador Anund Prayay Neewoor
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Mauritius to the United Nations
211 East 43rd St., 15th Floor, New York, NY 10017
 
Ambassador Adolfo Miguel Aguilar-Zinser
 Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations
Two United Nations Plaza, 28th Floor
New York NY 10017
 

Ambassador Ole Peter Kolby
 Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations
825 Third Avenue, 39th Floor, New York, NY 10022
 

Ambassador Sergey Lavrov
Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations
136 East 67th Street, New York, NY 10021

Ambassador Kishore Mahbubani
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Singapore to the United Nations
231 East 51st Street, New York, NY 10022
 
Ambassador Dr. Mikhail Wehbe
Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations
820 Second Avenue, 15th Floor
New York, NY 10017

Ambassador Sir Jeremy Greenstock
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations
One Dag Hammarskjold Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, New York, NY 10017
 

Ambassador John D. Negroponte  
Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations
799 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017-3505