Bush Began Iraq War Planning In January 2001
Paul O'Neill
'The Price Of Loyalty'

"On the afternoon of January 30, ten days after his inauguration as the forty-third president, George W.Bush met with the principals of his National Security Council for the first time.... The designated topic was 'Middle East Policy,' but the agendas that had been sent round over the preceding days had offered only thin details.... He turned to Rice. 'So Condi, what are we going to talk about today? What's on the agenda?' 'How Iraq is destabilising the region, Mr. President,' Rice, said in what several observers understood was a scripted exchange. She noted that Iraq might be the key to reshaping the entire region. Rice said that CIA director Tenet would offer a briefing on the latest intelligence on Iraq. Tenet pulled out a long scroll, the size of an architectural blueprint, and flattened it on the table. It was a grainy photograph of a factory. Tenet said that surveillance planes had taken this photo. The CIA believed the building might be 'a plant that produces either chemical or biological materials for weapons manufacture.'... Cheney motioned to the deputies, the backbenchers, lining the wall. 'Come on up,' he said with uncharacteristic excitement, waving his arm. 'You have to take a look at this.'... After a moment, [Treasury Secretary Paul] O'Neill interjected, 'I've seen a lot of factories around the world that look a lot like this one. What makes us suspect that this one is producing chemical or biological weapons?' Tenet mentioned a few items of circumstantial evidence - such as the round-the-clock rhythm of shipments in and out of the plant - but said there was 'no confirming intelligence' as to the materials being produced... The hour almost up, Bush had assignments for everyone.... Rumsfeld and Shelton [Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff], he said, 'should examine military options.' That included rebuilding the military coalition from the 1991 Gulf War, examining 'how it might look' to use U.S. ground forces in the north and the south of Iraq and how the armed forces could support groups inside the country who could help challenge Saddam Hussein.... Meeting adjourned. Ten days in, and it was about Iraq. O'Neill walked back to Treasury, running scenes from the situation room through his head. 'Getting Hussein was now the administration's focus, that much was already clear,' he recalled... The meeting had seemed scripted. Rumsfeld had said little, Cheney nothing at all, though both men had long entertained the idea of overthrowing Saddam. Rice orchestrated, and Tenet had a presentation ready. Powell seemed surprised that we were abandoning the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and making Iraq the focal point. General Shelton appeared concerned. Was there already an 'in group' and an 'out' group.?... Shortly after he returned to his office, O'Neill opened a memo from Donald Rumsfeld. It was titled 'Talking Points, FY01 and FY02-07 Budget Issues.' For the most part, however, it was not a traditional budget document. In describing why the military budget was due for a dramatic increase, Rumsfeld articulated, with a five-point illustration of a dire global landscape, the underlying ideas that were now guiding foreign policy...'The civil sector, not the defense sector, now creates the enabling technologies for advanced military capabilities. These universally available technologies can be used to create 'asymmetric' responses by small or medium sized states to our conventional military power that cannot defeat our forces, but can deny access to critical areas of Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.'.....The next meeting of the NSC principals was called for 3 p.m. on Thursday, February 1, in the White House Situation Room. O'Neill arrived a few minutes early and read the cover sheet of his briefing materials [which indicated that the whole meeting was concerned with Iraq including 'Political-Military Plan for Post-Saddam Iraq Crisis (interagency working paper) - SECRET'.].... Powell began by discussing the new strategy for 'targeted sanctions.' But, after a moment, Rumsfeld interrupted. 'Sanctions are fine,' he said. 'But what we really want to think about is going after Saddam.' He then launched into an assessment of the broader U.S. goal of getting rid of Saddam and replacing the current regime with one more inclined towards cooperative relations with the United States and its Western allies.... Rumsfeld began to talk in general terms about post-Saddam Iraq, dealing with the Kurds in the north, the oil fields, the reconstruction of the country's economy, and the 'freeing of the Iraqi people'. The hanging question was how to arrive at this desired goal.... O'Neill thought about Rumsfeld's memo.... A weak but increasingly obstreperous Saddam might be useful as a demonstration model of America's new, unilateral resolve.... 'There was never any rigorous talk about this sweeping idea that seemed to be driving all the specific actions,' O'Neill said, echoing the comments of several other participants in NSC discussions. 'From the start, we were building the case against Hussein and looking at how we could take him out and change Iraq into a new country. And, if we did that, it would solve everything. It was all about finding a way to do it. That was the tone of it. The President saying, 'Fine. Go find me a way to do this.'"
Chapter 2 - A Way To Do It
The Price Of Loyalty - Free Press 2004
(Ron Suskind's book about Bush Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill based on interviews with O'Neill and copies of over 19,000 Bush Administration documents provided by O'Neill - the book was vetted for accuracy by O'Neill prior to publication and serves as his own insider account of the workings of the Bush administration)

"Beneath the surface was a battle O'Neill had seen brewing since the NSC meeting on 30 January. It was Powell and his moderates at the State Department versus hard-liners like Rumsfeld, Cheney, and Wolfowitz, who were already planning the next war in Iraq and the shape of a post-Saddam country. Documents were being prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency, Rumsfeld's intelligence arm, mapping Iraq's oil fields and exploration areas and listing companies that might be interested in leveraging the precious asset. One document, headed 'Foreign Suitors for Iraqi Oilfield Contracts,' lists companies from thirty countries - including France, Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom - their specialities, bidding histories, and in some cases their particular areas of interest. An attached document maps Iraq with markings for 'supergiant oilfield,' 'other oil-field,' and 'earmarked for production sharing,' while demarking the largely undeveloped southwest of the country into nine 'blocks' to designate areas for future exploration. The desire to 'dissuade' countries from engaging in 'asymmetrical challenges' to the United States - as Rumsfeld said in his January articulation of the demonstrative value of a preemptive attack - matched with plans for how the world's second largest oil reserve might be divided among the world's contractors made for an irresistible combination, O'Neill later said. Already by February, the talk was mostly about logistics. Not the why, but the how and how quickly. Rumsfeld, O'Neill recalled, was focused on how an incident might cause escalated tensions - like the shooting down of an American plane in the regular engagements between U.S. fighters and Iraqi antiaircraft batteries - and what U.S. responses to such an occurrence might be. Wolfowitz was pushing for the arming of Iraqi opposition groups and sending in U.S. troops to support and defend their insurgency. He had written in Foreign Affairs magazine in 1999 that 'the United States should be prepared to commit ground forces to protect a sanctuary in southern Iraq where the opposition could safely mobilise."
Chapter 3 - No Fingerprints
The Price Of Loyalty - Free Press 2004
(Ron Suskind's book about Bush Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill based on interviews with O'Neill and copies of over 19,000 Bush Administration documents provided by O'Neill - the book was vetted for accuracy by O'Neill prior to publication and serves as his own insider account of the workings of the Bush administration)

"Any student of the presidency knows it is extremely rare for a campaign pledge to be broken in the first one hundred days, the time when a newly elected leader carries, most forcefully, the banner of vox populi, ready to do 'what I was elected to do.'... Yet Bush's campaign positions, that the United States would be noninterventionist ... were the very opposite of the policy that O'Neill, Powell, and the other NSC principals now saw unfolding. Actual plans, to O'Neill's astonishment, were already being discussed to take over Iraq and occupy it - complete with disposition of the oil fields, peacekeeping forces, and war crimes tribunals..."
Chapter 4 - Base Elements
The Price Of Loyalty - Free Press 2004
(Ron Suskind's book about Bush Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill based on interviews with O'Neill and copies of over 19,000 Bush Administration documents provided by O'Neill - the book was vetted for accuracy by O'Neill prior to publication and serves as his own insider account of the workings of the Bush administration)

"Later that afternoon, March 19, O'Neill and members of the Vice President's National Energy Policy Development Group filed into the cabinet room to present their findings to the President about the state of energy production and consumption in the United States. This presentation marked the completion of the first two phases (the second would be creating policy recommendations) that had been decided on in late January, when the President officially empowered Dick Cheney to handle energy. The Vice President, upon receiving his charge, had vowed it wouldn't be the way it was before. In this case, before meant the energy task force that the first President Bush called into action in 1989 to assess what powered America and how to wean the country from dependence on oil. Back then, Energy Secretary James D. Watkins was in charge. There were eighteen public hearings. Four hundred and ninety-nine individuals from forty-three states participated in the forums..... In this Bush administration, Dick Cheney looked to keep it simple. Also quiet and efficient. He had been in both the Nixon and Ford administrations in periods of energy crises. He had witnessed sound and fury on energy policy during Bush I that in the end amounted to nothing. He'd run an energy company, Halliburton, for five years in the 1990s, and - all things considered - viewed himself an expert. That meant no public hearings or debate from opposing factions were required. Cheney was sure he knew all he needed to know..... O'Neill thought Cheney's task force was oddly constructed: made up solely of government officials. Most task forces go in the other direction: their strength is in creating a structure for government officials to mix with leading experts, former top public officials, or respected businessmen. Such entities are covered under the Federal Advisory Committee Act, or FCA, which mandates that the activities of groups that combine governmental and nongovernmental officials be fully disclosed to the public; lists of members, advisers, agendas, and minutes of meetings must be made available. Because this was a task force with only government employees, there were no reporting requirements. O'Neill knew Cheney liked it that way... This task force, Cheney's, would operate in utmost privacy. Not that other voices didn't join in the conversation. Industry representatives - in bureaucratic language, the 'nonfederal stakeholders' - were just outside the door.... According to documents in O'Neill's files, along with those obtained in various disclosure actions filed against the Cheney task force, Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham met with Corporations and trade groups, including Chevron, the National Mining Association, and the National Petrochemical and Refiners Association, each of which delivered policy recommendations in detailed reports... If process drives outcomes - an axiom O'Neill and his fellow pragmatists live by - this combination of confidentiality and influence by powerful interested parties would define the task force's analysis of energy issues... So, on March 19, at an hour-long meeting in the cabinet room, the President was hearing dark predictions about the economic effects of a looming energy crisis... For today's meeting, the stage direction had come from the Vice President's office and, as expected, Dick went first, sitting in the chair directly across from the President. He talked about the task force's structure, its methodology, and the sources it had relied upon. He said that the goal of phase one had been to 'assess more clearly what the energy needs are of a growing country and how to meet them.' O'Neill then talked, as scripted, about the way rising energy costs would cripple the economy and how the California crisis could spread to other regions, driving up energy costs for the coming summer. Spencer Abraham addressed the beleaguered coal industry, which still produces half the nation's energy, and how rising gas prices could be caused by 'unfolding supply constraints' in the United States. Secretary of Agriculture Ann Veneman offered a short rendition of how rising fuel prices would affect agriculture. Larry Lindsey described how energy costs washed through many parts of the U.S. economy and hit certain areas of manufacturing particularly hard. And around the table they went."
Chapter 4 - Base Elements
The Price Of Loyalty - Free Press 2004
(Ron Suskind's book about Bush Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill based on interviews with O'Neill and copies of over 19,000 Bush Administration documents provided by O'Neill - the book was vetted for accuracy by O'Neill prior to publication and serves as his own insider account of the workings of the Bush administration)

"The Imperial Hotel in Tokyo, one of the world's great hotels, offered an oasis of luxury and comfort for the U.S. delegation after an exhausting week of meetings in Beijing with Chinese leaders in early September.... [O'Neill] flipped on the television to CNN. And sat on the edge of the bed. He stared at the flaming building, and his mind reeled backward to 1945, when he was a kid in Missouri and saw a newsreel at the movie theatre of a plane hitting the Empire State Building. The plane looked so small, like a penknife stuck in a sequoia. Good God, O'Neill thought, this must be the worst FAA mistake in history - some air traffic controller guided a plane into the Twin Towers...Then, as he watched smoke billow into the Manhattan sky, the second plane hit...There were no commercial flights available back to the States, many airports were closed. 'How do we get our hands on a military plane?' O'Neill asked.... Military cars arrived at midmorning the next day to pick up the O'Neill delegation..... The next morning, September 13, at 9:45 a.m., the NSC met with Bush in the situation room..... At an NSC meeting the day before, just as O'Neill's C-17 was landing at Andrew's Air Force Base, Rumsfeld, had raised the question of Iraq. The Pentagon had been working for months on a military plan for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein."
Chapter 5 - The Scale Of Tragedy
The Price Of Loyalty - Free Press 2004
(Ron Suskind's book about Bush Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill based on interviews with O'Neill and copies of over 19,000 Bush Administration documents provided by O'Neill - the book was vetted for accuracy by O'Neill prior to publication and serves as his own insider account of the workings of the Bush administration)