Axis of Lies is spun to hide the truth
Something very odd is happening. The
suspect wanted by the police for masterminding the 7/7 and 21/7 bombings,
Haroon Rashid Aswat, has now been detained in the UK for seven months, but apparently not
even been questioned about the bombings. Instead he is being held awaiting a
decision by the Home Secretary to extradite him to the US on the grounds of setting up a
terrorist training base in Oregon. This may however be explained by the
sensational statement made on the US Fox Television network by the American terrorism
expert, John Loftus, a former senior FBI prosecutor, that Aswat is in fact an agent of MI6
and has been under their protection for many years. In Loftus own words:
Whats really embarrassing is that the entire British police are out chasing
him, and one wing of the Government, MI6 or the British Secret Service, has been hiding
him
Hes a double agent.
This is not the first time
that information put into the public domain by the UK security services has turned out to
be distinctly dodgy. We were told for months that US rendition flights taking
prisoners to countries that sanctioned torture had never landed at British
airfields. It is now admitted that two CIA-chartered aircraft used for this
purpose landed at least 14 times at Northolt and Brize Norton in a 7-month period shortly
after the Iraq War.
We were told (eerily
familiar from the 9/11 attacks) that the 7/7 London bombings last year came out of the
blue and the security services had no prior warning. We now know, from
internal security sources, that MI5 was aware a year beforehand that two of the bombers
were planning to fight for Al-Qaeda, and had bugged them for two months as they talked
about this and their plans to return to a camp in Pakistan for British
terrorists. Rebel MI5 agents have leaked documents showing Ministers withheld
information from the public about what the security services knew about the suspects
before the bombings. They want an inquiry into intelligence
failures, but this has been rejected.
When the Brazilian
Jean Charles de Manezes was shot shortly after the abortive 21 July bombings, a series of
allegations about his behaviour and clothing were made public to justify his wrongful
killing. Again, we now know that none of them was true.
We are already familiar, in the
case particularly of the Iraq War, of stories being planted in the public domain to
manipulate opinion into the acceptance of policies that would otherwise have been
insupportable. The story of an alleged poison gas attack on the
London Underground broke in November 2002, four months before the Iraq War was
started. MI5 and police sources were cited to claim that a terrorist
attack had been nipped in the bud. In fact, no plot had been discovered.
Even more significantly, on
5 January 2003, just two months before the war, a police raid on a flat in Wood Green,
north London, was said to have found a poisons laboratory, including recipes
for ricin. Two days later the Prime Minister announced that the discovery
highlighted the dangers of WMD and that the arrests show this danger is present and
real and with us now. Its potential is huge. Yet on that
same day chemical weapons experts at Porton Down had found in more accurate tests that the
initial positive result for ricin was false. There was no ricin in the
flat. But this crucial evidence was kept suppressed for over two
years. When by chance it did come to light in the Kamel Bourgass murder case,
the defence lawyers argued that it was a massive conspiracy tapestry woven by the
authorities, and used by the government to justify the war in Iraq and detention without
trial in the UK.
A similar tactic was used to
legitimise the war in Kosovo in 1999. The then US Defence Secretary, William
Cohen, claimed that Weve now seen about 100,000 military-aged [Albanian] men
missing
they may have been murdered. The Prime Minister invoked the
Holocaust, and the British press took up the call with headlines like Flight from
genocide. Yet a year later the International War Crimes Tribunal found
that the final body count in Kosovos mass graves was less than
2,800. The genocide-that-wasnt had legitimised a war that was actually
aimed at the dismemberment of the last centralised State-run economy in Europe.
Even when the
true facts have been uncovered by independent investigation, the security services may
still try to spin a false line. When the American-led Iraq Survey Group were
due to report categorically after the war that there were no WMD in Iraq, John Scarlett,
head of the UK Joint Intelligence Committee, still tried to insert 9 nuggets
into the report, reintroducing claims that the ISG had already found to be false, to make
it appear that maybe there were still WMD out there. Not content with the
sexing up of the Governments original dossier, he then tried to do the
same to the US report.
The
implications of this catalogue of fabrications, distortions and lies are
serious. Can the security services and the authorities be trusted?
Two reforms are clearly called for. One concerns the Commons Intelligence and
Security Committee which at present is appointed by the Prime Minister and reports
directly to him, and he can edit their report before publication if he
chooses. If intelligence briefings are not to be selectively used or
misrepresented for political purposes, the ISC should in future be appointed by the House
as a whole, should receive full intelligence briefings on key issues, and should report
directly to the House.
Second,
allegations made by the security services or Home Office against alleged terrorists should
not by themselves alone justify indefinite detention by control orders without charge or
trial. Charges should be stated and a trial held unless a judge independently,
on the precedent of public interest indemnity certificates, concurs with the Home
Secretarys advice that there are overriding reasons of national security that the
evidence cannot be made public at an open trial. This is a reform which
Parliament should insist upon later this year when the Terrorism Act is due for
review. |